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The Separation of Powers Doctrine:
Straining Out Gnats, Swallowing
CamelsT
James M. McGoldrick, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1980's, the United States Supreme Court rediscovered the
separation of powers doctrine. 2 Although it is easy enough to de-
scribe the immediate impact,3 or lack thereof, of the glut of recent
separation of powers cases, it is harder to see that the results have
been worth the battle. And a gigantic battle it was. For example, in
two cases where Justice Scalia argued in vain that legislation was in-
1. I am grateful to my Research Assistant, Karen Eisenhauer, for her diligent
efforts in helping me to discover the various ramifications of the topic, and for Justice
Scalia's penetrating insights into the topic which he shared with a Pepperdine law
school class during the 1990 summer term. It was my privilege to sit in on that class
and watch a master teacher at work. I think that it is safe to say that Justice Scalia
knows all there is to know about the subject, and as this paper will no doubt reveal, I
have had to make do knowing the rest. I know that Justice Scalia will sleep better at
night knowing that no right thinking person could possibly believe that he even
remotely supports any of the views expressed herein.
* Professor of Law, Pepperdine University; J.D., University of Chicago 1969;
B.A., Pepperdine University.
2. "Rediscovered" may be too strong a word, in that it is not clear that the doc-
trine has ever been a significant limitation on governmental power. The separation of
powers doctrine should not be confused with the related doctrine of federalism,
whereby power is divided between a central government of enumerated--and thus
presumptively limited-powers and the various states, with reserved power to handle
any general welfare or police power concern. At least since Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 294 (1964), in which the Court held that Congress could regulate Ollie's ex-
clusively intrastate barbecue restaurant because Congress could legislatively con-
clude--despite the absence of any evidence at all-that its racial discrimination
adversely impacted interstate commerce in the interstate flow of mustard, etc., it has
been clear that there is no area, however local, that would not be subject to federal
regulation. Of course, that may have been a foregone conclusion from Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824), a century and a half before.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 24-43 for a brief summary of the impact of
those recent cases in which legislation was struck down on separation of powers
grounds.
valid on separation of powers grounds, he made the battle against the
statutes seem like the battle for the fate of the country itself. In
United States v. Mistretta,4 he refered to the earlier majority decision
in Morrison v. Olson5 as being based upon a "concept illogical and de-
structive of the structure of the Constitution,"6 but stated that Mis-
tretta "makes Morrison seem, by comparison, rigorously logical." 7
His concluding comments in Mistretta fairly ring from the mountain
tops, whether cursing the darkness or a prophetic call only time can
tell: "And in the long run the improvisation of a constitutional struc-
ture on the basis of currently perceived utility will be disastrous."8
Surely, Justice Scalia's point that the structure of our government
has been as crucial in protecting our individual rights as the enumer-
ation in the Bill of Rights itself is a valid one,9 but whether it is the
structure itself or the Court's protection of the structure seems more
debatable.10 For example, the political tension between both houses
of Congress raises few separation of powers issues,"1 but it seems as
significant in obtaining balanced legislation as does the separation of
powers tension between the legislative and executive branches. Cer-
tainly, the framers thought so.12 As long as each branch of the gov-
ernment is free to protect itself, it is less clear that the Court needs
to be vigilant in refereeing the fight.
But there are too many areas where the vigilance of the Court is
4. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
5. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
6. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 424 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 427.
9. See, e.g., Young v. United States ex reL Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
There are numerous instances in which the Constitution leaves open the theo-
retical possibility that the actions of one Branch may be brought to naught by
the actions or inactions of another. Such dispersion of power was central to
the scheme of forming a Government with enough power to serve the expan-
sive purposes set forth in the preamble of the Constitution, yet one that would
"secure the blessings of liberty" rather than use its power tyrannically.
Id. at 817 (Scalia, J., concurring).
10. Justice White made this same point in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 995-96
(1983) (White, J., dissenting).
11. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 110 S. Ct. 1964 (1990), for one of the rare
cases in which a separation of powers issue does arise in that regard, involving the re-
quirement that revenue bills originate in the House. Justice Scalia's willingness to ac-
cept Congress' statement as presumptively determinative of the issue, expressed in his
concurring opinion, id. at 1977-78 (Scalia, J., concurring), is interesting in view of his
vigilance for structure in other areas, but probably justified given the confused state of
the legislative process.
12. The record of the framing of the Constitution indicates that the make-up of
the two houses of Congress was perhaps the single most divisive issue considered by
the framers with the resulting non-proportional Senate and the population propor-
tional House being the "great compromise." Only the compromises concerning slavery
may have been more important in reaching agreement. See, for example, the standard
political science text, D.G. STEPHENSON, R. BREsLn, R. FRIEDRICH & J. Koru.sKY,
AMicIAN GovERNMENT 32-33 (1988).
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needed and it has not even engaged in the battle. The battle for sepa-
ration of powers principles is too much like buzzards battling over
the bleached bones long after the real battles have been fought and
lost, all too often without anyone having noticed that there was a bat-
tle at all. Or to pursue a different analogy, as Jesus said about the
Pharisees of his time and their insistence on keeping to the letter of
the Jewish law while having 'forgotten its spirit: "You strain out a
gnat but swallow a camel."'13
The real separation of powers issues have long since been resolved
and many not even under the banner of separation of powers. For
example, the Court's abandonment of the fight for federalism indi-
cates that the Court is not exactly consistent in its battle to protect
the structure.14 Any serious attempt to raise such issues is almost
13. Mathew 23:24 (New International).
14. Justice Scalia's ambivalence towards this issue is especially interesting. In the-
ory, to protect the balance of power between the states and the federal government
and also indirectly to protect individual rights by limiting the concentration of power,
Congress is limited to enumerated powers, including the selection of means with a nec-
essary and proper relationship to such powers. Since 1937, few if any federal laws have
been struck down on enumerated powers grounds. The modern approach is found in
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), wherein the Court said that
Congress could regulate the actual crossing of state lines and anything intrastate that
had a close and substantial impact on interstate commerce. Id. at 37-38. The close and
substantial test was to be determined by a pragmatic view of the actual facts of the
case. In the factually sympathetic case of Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964),
the Court found that federal laws reaching racial discrimination against exclusively in-
trastate customers eating at Ollie's Barbecue fell within Congress' power to protect in-
terstate commerce despite absolutely no evidence at all of such an impact. Id. at 304-
05. The Court said that Congress could rationally conclude that such discrimination
affected interstate shipment of products whether it did in fact or not. See id. at 304.
Initially, the Court utilized the rational basis test only in those cases in which Con-
gress had determined legislatively that certain matters would always affect interstate
commerce, but there is some indication that the rational basis test may have become
the all purpose test. Just last term, a unanimous court found that Congress' creation
of recreational trails out of long dormant railroad right of ways satisfied "the tradi-
tional rationality standard of review." Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 110
S. Ct. 914, 924 (1990). Why this is the standard of review as opposed to "close and sub-
stantial" is troubling enough, but the absence of any real effort to apply even the ra-
tionality standard is even stronger evidence of the Court's abdication of responsibility
for this structure issue. The framers were of a mind that the enumerated powers doc-
trine was such a significant protector of individual rights that no bill of rights was even
needed. While they were almost certainly wrong in that regard, it is not clear that the
doctrine could not play some such role. In the recent challenge to the federal flag
anti-desecration law, the law was struck down on free speech grounds, but there was
no discussion whatsoever of the absence of any enumerated power for Congress to pass
such a law. United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990). It is possible that Con-
gress has the implied power to protect our national symbols, similar to its implied
power to protect the "privileges and immunities of citizens," see Griffin v. Brecken-
ridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), but some discussion of that issue would have been merited.
laughable.15 The Court's use of the political question doctrine to
avoid resolution of foreign affairs issues has left us without any clear
line of authority as to ultimate responsibility for making life and
death decisions about use of military force in addressing international
conflict.16 The Court's acquiescence in the substitution of nonelec-
tive, politically isolated, administrative agencies for politically re-
viewable legislative and judicial decisions is so entrenched that to
complain would make cursing the darkness seem productive.17
The bulk of this paper will focus on the most egregious example of
the Court's abandonment of its rightful role in our tripartite system
of government. The rational basis test, used to analyze an increas-
ingly wide variety of constitutional issues,'8 represents a far more
15. See Daniei v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969), for Justice Black's description of how
local something must be to lie outside Congress' Commerce Clause power:
While it is the duty of courts to enforce [the Civil Rights Act], we are not
called on to hold nor should we hold subject to that Act this country people's
recreation center, lying in what may be, so far as we know, a little "sleepy
hollow" between Arkansas hills miles away from any interstate highway.
This would be stretching the Commerce Clause so as to give the Federal Gov-
ernment complete control over every little remote country place of recreation
in every nook and cranny of every precinct and county in every one of the 50
States.
Id. at 315 (Black, J., dissenting).
Nonetheless, the majority rejected even this minimal restriction on the reach of the
Commerce Clause.
16. Even as this article is being written the papers are full of the conflict between
the President and the Congress as to the appropriate role for Congress in deciding
whether to let the current stand off over Iraq's take over of Kuwait to escalate into
armed conflict. For example, the Los Angeles Times, October 18, 1990, began a front
page article as follows: "Secretary of State James A. Baker III insisted Wednesday
that the Bush Administration must be free to attack Iraq without getting specific ap-
proval from Capitol Hill, although he promised to consult frequently with congres-
sional leaders over U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf." Los Angeles Times, Oct. 18, 1990,
at 1, col. 6. See Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967) and Massachusetts v. Laird, 400
U.S. 886 (1970) for the Court's avoidance of this fundamental separation of powers is-
sue as it related to the Vietnam War.
17. See Commodities and Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 473 U.S. 568 (1985);
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric.. Prods. Co., 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (judicial power exer-
cised by administrative agencies). See also Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline, 337 F.
Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 490 U.S. 212 (1989)
(administrative agencies exercising "legislative" power).
18. Traditionally, the rational basis test has been used to determine the limits of
the government to impact nonfundamental substantive rights under the due process
clause and equal protection clauses or to use nonsuspect classifications under the equal
protection clause. It is also one of the tests which the Court uses to determine
whether a particular means' chosen by Congress to accomplish an enumerated end
bears a sufficiently close relationship to that end. More recently, Justice Scalia has ad-
vocated the test for inherent limitation issues not involving purposeful discrimination
against interstate commerce in place of the Court's traditional balancing test for such
issues. Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 257-59
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). It is not clear but this also may be his proposed test for
free exercise of religion issues not involving intentional discrimination against religion.
See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1604 n.3
(1990), wherein Justice Scalia rejected the compelling state interest test in free exer-
cise cases in which the government indirectly impacts religion in pursuit of nonre-
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significant abdication of judicial responsibility over the legislative
process than do all of the separation of powers cases in our history
lined end to end. And to risk pointing it out is almost as laughably
pitiful as complaining about the abandonment of federalism.
Although the rational basis test is used in other areas, unless stated
otherwise, it will be examined here only as applied to due process
and equal protection issues.19
Under the rational basis test, the courts will presume the constitu-
tionality of legislation and not find it invalid unless there are no facts
which could conceivably support the legislative conclusion that a par-
ligiously based general welfare goals. In the'footnote, he referred to alternatives to
the compelling state interest test used in racial discrimination and free 'speech cases.
In the race cases, the alternative for disproportionate racial impact was rational basis.
In the free speech cases, the alternative for content neutral time place and manner
laws was balancing. Scalia failed to indicate which'of these two alternatives he was
applying in Employment Division.
19. There is no particular need to distinguish between the application of the ra-
tional basis test to due process problems as opposed to equal protection issues. It is
essentially the same test. Generally speaking, due process claims attack the unfairness
of the overall law as it impacts substantive interest, while equal protection claims ad-
mit the overall wisdom of the law but challenge classifications within the law. Most
issues can be framed as either. For example, laws limiting the rights of adult gays to
engage in consenting sexual acts may be said to impact the liberty interest in choosing
one's own life style, a due process issue. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Alternatively, it can be asserted that allowing adult heterosexuals to engage in con-
senting sexual acts which the law denies to gays is a denial of equal protection. See
Hatheway v. Secretary of the Army, 641 F.2d 1376, 1381-85 (1981). In both instances, it
is not whether the law is framed as a due process or equal protection issue that is im-
portant, but rather, the level of review the Court gives to the issue. See Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), for an example of the Court in dispute as to whether a
restriction on the right to marry was a due process or an equal protection issue. "The
problem in this case is not one of discriminatory classifications, but of unwarranted en-
croachment upon a constitutionally protected freedom." Id. at 391-92 (Stewart, J., con-
curring). Depending on the facts, the issue may be better framed as either due process
or equal protection. For example, in Railway Express Agency v. N.Y., 336 U.S. 106
(1949), in order to address the traffic safety problem of distracting advertisements on
the side of vehicles, New York law allowed such advertisements for one's own benefit,
but not for others. The due process claim that the law did not rationally relate to any
legitimate governmental interest was particularly weak since there was an obvious re-
lationship to legitimate traffic safety concerns. The equal protection claim that all dis-
tracting ads ought to be treated alike was a much stronger legal argument---although
also a loser in the case. Nonetheless, the equal protection claim was a more focused
attack on the weakness of the law than the more general bombast of the due process
claim. See Justice Jackson's concurring opinion, id. at 112 (Jackson, J., concurring), in
which he points out the danger of selective enforcement which can flow from under
inclusive classifications that would not be a problem with a due process issue.
"[N]othing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to
pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus escape the
political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected."
Id.
ticular law was rationally related to the accomplishment of any legiti-
mate governmental purpose, although not necessarily the purpose for
which it was actually passed.2 0 The first thing that should be obvious
about this common statement of the rational basis test is that it has
very little to do with rationality and everything to do with judicial
abdication. As the Court has said time and time again, it does not sit
as a super legislature to substitute its judgment for the legislative
judgment, but, of course, that is the very power which Chief Justice
Marshall successfully claimed for the Court in Marbury v.
Madison.21 Thus, if as James Madison asserted,2 2 checks and bal-
ances are as important to separation of powers as a clear delineation
of responsibility, the Court's abdication of its role as a check on the
legislature is a serious danger to the structure which Justice Scalia
finds so important.
II. LIMITED IMPACT OF RECENT SEPARATION OF POWERS CASES
First, a brief review of the recent separation of power cases seems
to be in order. Under the Separation of Powers Doctrine, the execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial branches can operate only according to
their own constitutionally enumerated powers, 23 cannot delegate
their power to some other branch or entity, and cannot invade the
power delegated to one of the other branches.24 The first major as-
20. Daniel v. Family Sec. Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949). A statute which pro-
hibited undertakers from selling insurance was challenged on the basis that it was the
direct result of the activities of the "insurance lobby." The Court found this irrele-
vant, stating, "a judiciary must judge by results, not by the varied factors which may
have determined legislators' votes. We cannot undertake a search for motive in testing
constitutionality." Id. at 224.
21. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). "It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular
cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule." Id. at 177.
22. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 308 (J. Madison) (New American Library 1961)
"[U]nless these departments, [Executive, Legislative and Judicial] be so far connected
and blended as to give to each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of
separation which [Montesquieu's] maxim requires, as essential to a free government,
can never in practice be duly maintained." Id.
23. The foundation of separation of powers is expressed with remarkable economy
of words by the framers in the first line of each of the first three articles of the Consti-
tution: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 1; "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; "The judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art. III § 1.
24. There are various permutations of the doctrine. Perhaps, the most common is
the nondelegation doctrine, the principle that Congress cannot delegate its legislative
power unless it provides an "intelligible principle" to guide the executive branch in
filling in the details of the congressional policy. For an excellent discussion see
Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give it Substance? 83 MICH. L.
REV. 1223, 1224-26 (1985). However, with the exception of two cases during its laissez
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sertion of the doctrine in the eighties occurred in 1982, when the
Court found that the Bankruptcy Courts, non-Article III legislative
courts, had been improperly given judicial power to decide cases ap-
propriate only for Article III courts. 25 Although the reasoning of the
justices differed, the Court did find that such jurisdiction was a viola-
tion of separation of powers principles.26 The blockbuster case came
faire period when the Court grasped at anything to strike down New Deal or pro-labor
legislation, the Supreme Court has never found the doctrine violated. See A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). The obvious suspicion is that the doctrine is as dead as the
economic jurisprudence that gave birth to it. Numerous state courts have applied a
similar state doctrine to reign in state administrative agencies, but there has been no
continued use at the federal level. See, e.g., Hialeah, Inc. v. Gulfstream Park Racing
Ass'n, 428 So. 2d 312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (unconstitutional delegation of power to
allocate winter horse racing periods); Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664
S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984) (unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to research
commission while legislature is in adjournment).
Another frequent separation of powers issue faced by the Court involves improper
limitations on the President's power to appoint and/or remove executive officials. As
recently as 1976, the Court found unconstitutional part of the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act of 1971 on the ground that Congress had improperly invaded the President's
appointment power. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). But these cases appear to be
little more than window dressing. When, in Humphrey's Executor v. United States,
295 U.S. 602 (1935), the Court allowed Congress to insulate administrative agency offi-
cials from executive dismissal without a finding of cause, the dye was cast.
The only truly common use of the separation of powers doctrine today is in the at-
tempt to come to grips with the incomprehensible "cases or controversies" require-
ment for federal courts to exercise Article III power. The political question element of
the cases or controversies requirement is, in its truest form, a separation of powers
problem. The Court is said to be unable to decide cases reserved by the Constitution
for one of the political branches of the government. More commonly, however, the
"political question doctrine" is invoked to avoid difficult issues such as whether the ad-
vice and consent of the senate is required to cancel treaties as it is to enter into them.
See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
25. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982).
26. Legislative courts, also commonly but sometimes inaccurately called Article I
courts, are generally described in terms of what they are not. That is, they are not
Article III courts. Article III courts are those empowered under Article III of the Con-
stitution whereby the judges are appointed for life and guaranteed freedom from sal-
ary reduction, with resulting independence from the political fray. See id. at 59 (citing
Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681, 713 (1979)). In contrast,
judges for legislative courts are appointed pursuant to one of Congress' enumerated
powers, generally found in article I, § 8 of the Constitution, for a period of time to
address some special judicial need, but a judicial need felt to be inconsistent with cre-
ating additional Article III judges. The easiest illustration of this is the early territo-
rial judges who brought justice to the federal territories before they became states.
(The power to regulate the territories just happens to be in article IV, § 3, clause 2.)
But once the territories became states, most of the cases which were previously heard
by federal territorial judges fell under the jurisdiction of newly formed state courts.
To require that federal territorial judges be appointed for life would be inconsistent
in 1983 with INS v. Chadha,27 in which the Court found the "legisla-
tive veto" to be unconstitutional.28 This procedure allowed one or
both houses of Congress to reverse an executive agency decision by
resolution, contrary to the proper process for passing legislation: ap-
proval by both houses of our bicameral Congress and presentment to
the President for approval or veto. Chadha impacted over 200 differ-
ent executive agencies.2 9 In 1986, in Bowsher v. Synar,30 the Court
found that Congress had improperly given an employee of the legisla-
tive branch, the Comptroller General, executive power to determine
when the automatic spending cuts of the Gramm-Rudman Act kicked
in.s1
In its next decisions, the Court seemed to recognize limits to which
it would allow a formalistic approach to separation of powers to over-
ride practical concerns of efficient government. In 1988, with Morri-
with the part time need for such judges. Few of the other legislative courts-tax
courts and military courts being the most prominent of the legislative courts-serve
such a short term need. However, most are courts with limited responsibilities in a
specific area and thus believed not to require the high priced talent of creating hun-
dreds of additional federal district court judges. And thus, Congress is faced with the
tension, the conflict between the judicial independence guaranteed by the framers in
Article III, and the desire to handle a number of judicial issues in a more flexible less
expensive way. Prior to Northern Pipeline, there was no clear limit on Congress' abil-
ity to create legislative courts with limited functions. The cases after Northern Pipe-
line indicate that may still be the case. (The Court seems to have retreated even on
what seemed to be Northern Pipeline's only clear point, albeit in a concurring opinion,
that non-Article III courts could not decide state issues. See Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986), in which the Court upheld the Commission's
ability to decide state law counterclaims related to disputes over which it was granted
jurisdiction under the Commodity Exchange Act). Given the fact that administrative
agencies have been performing judicial functions for years, it is hard to generate much
interest in the ebb and flow of the Court's view of what legislative courts can or cannot
do. See, e.g., Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18
How.) 272 (1855) (the "public rights doctrine"); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932)
(the adjudicatory powers of administrative agencies).
27. 462 U.S. 916 (1983).
28. Id. at 959.
29. 462 U.S. 919, 968 (1983) (White, J., disseiting). See also, Appendix of White,
J., dissenting, id. at 1003-12. (An article on the subject, citing an appendix to Justice
White's dissent opinion counts only 126 such statues. See Note, The Fate of the Legisla-
tive Veto After Chadha, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 168, 170 n.12 (1984-85)). Of course, the
sheer number of administrative programs impacted is a misleading indicator of the
practical force of Chadha. Since Congress 'regularly reserved the power to review ex-
ecutive acts and just as regularly never did review such decisions, the actual impact of
COadha was far less than it might have appeared. See Strauss, Was there a Baby in the
Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme Court's Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE
L.J. 789 (1983). Congressional Research Service figures, which count 230 such vetoes
since 1930, reveal almost half involved reversal of immigration decisions. Id. at 790.
Mr. Chadha appears to have been an obscure student overstaying his student visa who
was granted permission to stay in the United States by the INS subject to Congress
legislative disapproval. Why of all the INS decisions routinely ignored-even rubber
stamped implies more review than was typical-Chadha was singled out is anyone's
guess.
30. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
31. Id. at 736.
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son v. Olson,3 2 over a vigorous dissent by Justice Scalia, the Court
rejected a challenge to the independent counsel provision of the Eth-
ics in Government Act of 1978.33 The Court held that judicial and
congressional appointment and oversight provisions were not incon-
sistent with the Attorney General's overall authority to execute the
laws.34 Finally, in Mistretta v. United States,35 again over a strong
dissent by Justice Scalia, the Court found that the United States Sen-
tencing Commission created by the Sentencing Reform Act of 19843 6
did not pose any significant danger of encroaching on either judicial
or executive power.3 7 The Court recognized that the drafting of
mandatory sentencing guidelines by the Commission, staffed by se-
lected federal judges, did tend to-mingle judicial officials into the
non-Article III tasks of drafting rules and regulations, arguably a leg-
islative function, but felt that some commingling of branches was
inherent. 38
The score in the significant cases for the 1980's was three for five
in favor of separation of powers issues. 39 With what results? Bank-
32. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
33. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (Supp. V 1982).
34. Mor/ison, 487 U.S. at 696-97.
35. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
36. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742 (Supp. IV 1986); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (Supp. IV 1986).-
37. Mistmetta, 488 U.S. at 412.
38. Id. at 386-87. Some commingling is built into the constitutional process. It is
part and parcel of the so called "checks and balances" of our constitutional system.
For example, Congress, pursuant to its Article III powers, creates additional, federal
courts of appeal. The President appoints the newjudges. The Senate confirms or dis-
affirms the presidential choice. Individual district court judges go about their Way try-
ing to be sufficiently noticed so as to be considered for this additional advancement in
their judicial career.
39. There were other separation of powers issues raised in this period, but none of
the magnitude of these. In Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 109 S. Ct.
2558 (1989), it was claimed that the Federal Advisory Committee Act ("FACA") re-
quirements that private groups advising the President on matters of public concern
hold open meetings applied to the Americah Bar Association ("ABA") Standing Com-
mittee on Federal Judiciary. The committee evaluates judicial candidates and reports
its findings to the President to assist him in making apj~ointments. The Court man-
aged to avoid any constitutional conflict with the President's poer to appoint judges
by construing the FACA as inapplicable to the advisory and neces.rily confidential
role of the ABA committee. Three Justices, however, (Kennedy, Rehnquist and
O'Connor) felt that the FACA did apply and in o doing conflicted with the'President's
power to appoint federal judges.
In Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 109 S. Ct. 1726 (1989), the Court found the
delegation to the Secretary of Transportation of the power to set pipeline safety user
fees was not an improper delegation of the power to tax. Id. at 1734. In United States
v. Munoz-Florez, 110 S. Ct. 1964 (1990), the Court found that it had the authority to
enforce the constitutional requirement that tax bills "originate" in the House, and that
the issue was not left solely to the discretion of Congress. -Issues which the Constitu-
ruptcy judges still are not appointed for life, but instead of the ple-
nary power granted them in the 1978 act, there are complicated
classifications of core and non-core matters with different levels of
review for each.40 The hundreds of thousands of administrative
agency decisions each year are not subject to lottery-like chances of
being "vetoed" by resolution of one or both houses of Congress. In-
stead, a number of administrative agencies now make only proposed
regulations with the lottery-like chance that Congress will choose not
to ratify them or change them beyond recognition.41 Finally, the con-
stitutional defects of Gramm-Rudman were cured by using a "fall
back" provision 42 included in the original bill. In short, each of the
"major" separation of powers decisions has had little practical effect.
III. THE ABANDONMENT OF JUDICIAL CONTROL THROUGH THE
RATIONAL BASIS TEST
Unlike the marginal impact of the recent reassertion of separation
of powers principles, the adoption of the rational basis test has had
dramatic, if not disastrous, consequences on the relationship between
the legislative and judicial branches. To understand the rational ba-
sis test requires a brief retreat into history.
Shortly after the fourteenth amendment was passed, the Court
found that the provision stating that "[no state shall] deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,"43 gave
some protection to substantive interests.44 The most common test
used initially was that the government could not restrict a person's
substantive interests unless such restrictions reasonably related to
some legitimate governmental interest. A classic illustration of the
"reasonable basis" test is found in Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co.45
There, the government banned the use of shoddy, a used fabric which
had been shredded and sterilized for use as padding, because of its
stated concern for health hazards and because of the danger that
shoddy, filled products might be misrepresented as products stuffed
with never used fillings. The Court held that the evidence did not
tion commits exclusively to the discretion of one of the other two branches of the gov-
ernment are called political questions because they are reviewable only by the political
process rather than judicial review.
40. 28 U.S.C. §§ 152-58, § 1334 (1982).
41. See Strauss, supra note 29, at 790 n.6 (describing the rush to adopt alternatives
to the legislative veto).
42. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 734-35 (discussing the alternative plan in-
cluded in the legislation itself, at § 274(f), to be used in the event any of the acounting
provisions in § 251 [(Reports of the Comptroller General)] were deemed
unconstitutional).
43. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
44. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 56 (1872). See also, Morse, The
Hohfeldian Approach to Constitutional Cases, 9 AKRON L. REV. 1 (1975).
45. 270 U.S. 402 (1926).
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support the finding of any health hazards due to the use of sterilized
shoddy, and that any concern for misrepresentation could be handled
through labeling requirements without unnecessarily restricting a
perfectly legitimate business.40 This test was also applied to govern-
mental restrictions implicating violations of the equal protection
clause. In general, a law treating different classes of people differ-
ently could be upheld only if it reasonably related to some legitimate
state interest. 47
While the "reasonable basis" analysis was the most commonly used
test until 1937, there was a parallel group of cases, illustrated by
Lochner v. New York,48 which were closer to a "compelling state in-
terest" test, although that term was not used.49 In Lochner, in order
to protect the health and safety of bakery employees, New York law
prevented bakery employees from working more than sixty hours
per week.50 The Court, although ostensibly applying the reasonable
basis test, concluded that no absolute connection existed between
hours worked and health and safety.5 ' It then speculated that the
law was actually passed for an improper purpose, not to protect
health and safety, but to regulate the contract between employers
and employees concerning hours that bakery employees worked.52
46. The constitutional guaranties [sic] may not be made to yield to mere con-
venience.... The business here involved is legitimate and useful; and, while
it is subject to all reasonable regulation, the absolute prohibition of the use of
shoddy in the manufacture of comfortables is purely arbitrary and violates the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Weaver, 270 U.S. at 415.
47. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) ("A classification
having some reasonable basis does not offend against [the equal protection] clause
merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it re-
sults in some inequality.").
48. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
49. For a discussion of the compelling state interest test see infra notes 98-113 and
accompanying text. See also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Chicago, M. & St.
P.R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 546
(1923) ("[F]reedom of contract is, nevertheless, the general rule and restraint the ex-
ception; and the exercise of legislative authority to abridge it can be justified only by
the existence of exceptional circumstances.")
50. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 52.
51. Id. at 58.
We think the limit of the police power has been reached and passed in this
case. There is, in our judgment, no reasonable foundation for holding this to
be necessary or appropriate as a health law to safeguard the public health or
the health of the individuals who are following the trade of a baker.
Id.
52. Id.
Statutes of the nature of that under review, limiting the hours in which grown
and intelligent men may labor to earn their living, are mere meddlesome in-
Once it arrived at this Holmesian conclusion, it found that the latter
purpose was an unconstitutional interference with the fundamental
right to contract,53 a right not specifically found in the constitution.M
Until 1937, the Court used the reasonable basis test to review and
uphold most general welfare police power regulations; however, in
cases like Weaver, the Court found unnecessary, or overly harsh, re-
strictions on individuals and their endeavors to be violative of sub-
stantive due process rights. The Court used the Lochner test and its
view that certain kinds of economic interests fall within the umbrella
of the fundamental right to contract, to strike down a relatively nar-
row range of laws impacting employer-employee relations and other
types of business interests.m5 Using the equivalent of the present-day
"compelling state interest" test, Lochner required strict judicial scru-
tiny in both the factual determination of the necessity for any law, as
well as close vigilance against any impermissible purposes.
While the reasonable basis test generated no particular contro-
versy, "Lochnerism" blunted the states' attempts to address a
number of societal problems believed to be caused in part by an im-
balance of power between labor and management.56 Using a similar
terferences with the rights of the individual, and they are not saved from con-
demnation by the claim that they are passed in the exercise of the police
power and upon the subject of the health of the individual whose rights .are
interfered with.
Id.
53. Id. at 64. "Under such circumstances the freedom of master and employe (sic]
to contract with each other in relation to their employment, and in defining the same,
cannot be prohibited or interfered with, without violating the Federal Constitution."
Id.
54. ' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, prevents states from impairing obligations of contract,
but for its history, the provision has been limited to retroactive impairments and even
then to retroactive impairments not outweighed by some governmental purpose.
Although no precedent as such existed for the protection which Lochner gave to the
right to contract, it parallels the Court's creation of fundamental rights in more recent
cases. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (the right of privacy); Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (the. right to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) (the right to travel interstate). In Lochner, as in the rest of these cases, there is
no explicit recognition of the right, but the constitutional concern expressed for re-
lated rights justified the Court's elevating their normal due process and equal protec-
tion analysis from the rational basis test to some stricter scrutiny, such as the
compelling state interest test, in each of these cases. The Court in Griswold takes
pains to reject the comparison with Lochner, but that of course is simply self serving.
55. See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1
(1915) (striking down laws which forbade contracts requiring employees to agree not
to become members of a labor union); Tyson & Bro. United Theatre Ticket Offices v.
Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927) (striking down a law fixing theater ticket prices).
56. The Court's protection of business was not limited to due process issues. The
Court similarly treated a number of cases involving Congress' enumerated powers. As
stated above, Congress is limited to enumerated powers. See supra note 14. Using this
doctrine, the Court found federal attempts to address various issues involving labor in-
equities as being exclusively within state power and beyond the scope of federal power.
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), is illustrative because of its parallel to
Lochner. The Court in Hammer rejected a federal law banning the interstate ship-
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analysis, the Court also struck down much of President Franklin
Roosevelt's New Deal legislation as being beyond Congress' enumer-
ated powers.57 The end result was a political uproar with justifiable
criticism of the Court for adopting a laissez faire view of government
toward business, preventing both the states and the federal govern-
ment from adopting a more activist role in addressing societal eco-
nomic problems.58
Largely as the result of the appointment of new members of the
Supreme Court by President Roosevelt,5 9 the Court in 1937 and 1938
rejected both its restricted view of Congress' enumerated power and
its expansive view of the due process limitations.60 In rejecting a-lim-
ited view of Congress' enumerated powers, the Court said that Con-
gress could regulate any activity that had a close and substantial
impact on interstate commerce; the court then undertook a practical
factual evaluation to apply that test.6 1 In rejecting the strict scrutiny
of Lochner, the Court adopted the rational basis test, thus effectively
eschewing not only Lochnerism but also the perfectly valid reason-
ment of goods produced by child labor. First, the Court professed not to be able to see
how interstate shipment of such goods could have any bearing on interstate commerce,
and then second, using its Holmesian logic of Lochner fame, found that the real gov-
ernmental purpose was actually not to regulate interstate shipping but the manufac-
turing of goods through use of child labor. Id. at 271-72. This purpose, the Court
concluded, was outside the scope of federal power because, under the tenth amend-
ment, it was within state power. Id. at 276. Cases dating back to Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), holding that Congress could regulate local activities affecting
interstate commerce, were simply ignored as was the plain language of the tenth
Amendment that federal power was to be defined first.
57. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (Congress
could not regulate commerce once it had stopped traveling interstate). Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (Congress could not regulate commerce before it
began traveling interstate).
58. E. BARRETTr, JR., W. COHEN & J. VARAT, CONSTTUrTIONAL LAW, CASES AND
MATERIALS 220-22 (8th ed. 1989).
59. There is considerable scholarly debate about whether Roosevelt's attempt to
pack the Court led to a fortuitous "switch which saved nine," but there is no question
that the new appointees solidified the changed approach. See Frankfurter, Mr. Justice
Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 311 (1955).
60. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1937). "The funda-
mental principle is that the power to regulate commerce is the power to enact 'all ap-
propriate legislation' for its 'protection or advancement.'" Id. (quoting The Daniel
Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 564 (1870)). See also, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379 (1937); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (allowed
facts to be presumed to facilitate congressional restrictions of substantive due process).
61. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) ("[E]ven if appellee's ac-
tivity be local ... it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.").
able basis test.62
There is no question that the Court was justified in rejecting Loch-
ner's nontextual and artificial elevation of the right to contract, but
there is no real justification for its rejection of the practical factual
evaluation of the reasonable basis test. To say that a law is, from a
factual point of view, wasteful, unwise, and improvident is not the
same thing as automatically preferring one economic theory over an-
other. Yet, the resulting rational basis test deprived the Court of
both abilities. The list of cases is endless, but few are more blatant
than Williamson v. Lee Optical.63 In Lee Optical, the trial court
found as a matter of fact that Oklahoma's attempt to keep discount
optometrists out of Oklahoma was "not reasonably and rationally re-
lated to the health and welfare of the people."64 The Supreme
Court accepted that finding, but concluded that perhaps, maybe, con-
ceivably, possibly, there were other facts which the legislature knew,
or may have known, or perhaps could have imagined, which might
support Oklahoma's expressed concern for eye health or any other
undeclared purpose. Thus, the law was rationally related to some le-
gitimate state end.65 The Court concluded that it was a legislative
rather than a judicial decision, the ultimate separation of powers
"cop out" under the due process guise.66
Few cases illustrate the difference between the reasonable basis
test and the rational basis test as well as the 1938 decision in United
States v. Carolene Products Co. case.67 Federal law banned the inter-
62. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152.
[Flor regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not
to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known
or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption
that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of
the legislators.
Id. (emphasis added).
63. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
64. Id. at 486. The Court acknowledged that the law "may exact a needless, waste-
ful requirement in many cases." Id. at 487.
65. Id. at 487.
"IT]he legislature might have concluded that [a prescription] was needed often
enough to require one in every case. Or the legislature may have concluded
that eye examinations were so critical, ... that every change in frames and
every duplication of a lens should be accompanied by a prescription from a
medical expert."
Id.
66. The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and in-
dustrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of
harmony with a particular school of thought. [citations omitted] We empha-
size again what Chief Justice Waite said in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134
• .. "For protection against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to
the polls, not to the courts."
Id. at 488 (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876)).
67. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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state shipment of "filled milk." The ban included the plaintiff's co-
conut-milk-enriched skim milk product, called Milnut, for two
reasons: first, the health and safety concern for the sale of milk prod-
ucts allegedly less nutritious than regular milk; and second, the con-
cern that such products might be passed off as regular milk.68 Like
the ban on shoddy in the Weaver 69 case, the evidence indicated that
Milnut was every bit as healthy-or in view of modern cholesterol
concerns, as unhealthy--as regular milk and that labeling would han-
dle any illegitimate uses of Milnut. Milnut had several significant
advantages over regular milk, including price. Considering it was
1938, additional advantages were that it did not require refrigeration
and was a convenient milk substitute for lower income persons. De-
spite the almost perfect factual fit with Weaver in that there was no
evidence70 that the law advanced the public interest in any way--as
distinguished from the dairy interest-the Court nonetheless upheld
the law as being rationally related to legitimate governmental inter-
ests. 71 This holding meant that the legislature was free to find a ra-
tional relationship to public welfare despite the total absence of such
evidence.
What is most disturbing about the Court's rejection of the reason-
able basis test in favor of the rational basis test is the Court's lack of
reasoning for the substitution. All of the justifications for adopting
the rational basis test go to the abuses of the Lochner strict scrutiny
test, the Court's artificial elevation of non-textual rights beyond gov-
ernmental regulation.72 The reasonable basis test has none of these
elements, yet it was rejected as well. Carolene Products explained
68. Id. at 145-47.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 45-47.
70. The Court does not cite any evidence introduced at trial as to the health and
safety of Milnut as compared with regular milk. It finds all of its support in the testi-
mony of witnesses-primarily spokespersons for dairy interest-before the Congres-
sional committee that proposed the law. Such testimony is obviously not the same as
evidence, and that is the point of the rational basis test. The Court does not deem it
necessary to consider evidence in support of a particular law, thus the person challeng-
ing the law must show not only that there is no known evidentiary support for the law
but also that there is no conceivable support in the minds of the legislature to support
the law.
71. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152. "[B]y their very nature such inquiries,
where the legislative judgment is drawn in question, must be restricted to the issue
whether any state of facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed affords
support for it." Id. at 154.
72. The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner, Coppage, Adkins, Burns, and like
cases--that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when
they believe the legislature has acted unwisely-has long since been discarded.
We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not
that the rational basis test leaves correction of errors in the legisla-
tive process to the political process.73 Thus, correction of errors is
left to the same legislative process that led to the adoption of the
needless, wasteful, unwise, improvident, unnecessary law to begin
with.
There are several reasons why the political processes will not pro-
tect against abuse. The most obvious one is that organized groups
like dairy interest are more effectively able to use-the more cynical
might say "buy"74--the political process than the poor soul seeking
an inexpensive alternative to refrigerated milk, or the small in-
dependent entrepreneur who tries to meet that market. Carolene
Products itself seemed to recognize the inadequacies of the political
process when, in one of the most famous footnotes in Supreme Court
history, it set the stage for a multilevel approach to substantive due
process and equal protection analysis. 75 The Court stated that there
might be cases in which the limited judicial review of the rational ba-
sis test would not adequately protect individual interests, and then
gave two primary examples of that type of case. The first would be
regulations of free speech which restrict the free marketplace of
ideas and thus taint the political process. 76 The second would be reg-
ulations affecting minority interests, defined broadly to include ra-
cial, religious, political and labor minorities, since such interests can
rarely use the political process effectively.77
The Court apparently did not notice that the ban on Milnut had
both of these qualities. Surely, "money, the mother's milk of poli-
tics"7S--as former state speaker in California Jess Unruh described it
in terms especially appropriate for the Carolene Products case-
taints the political process every bit as much as free speech regula-
tion. If not, why is there the rush to regulate the financing of elec-
tions?79  As to the second concern for minority interests,
substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative
bodies, who are elected to pass laws.
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963). See also, Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1938).
73. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152-54.
74. Of course, even an offer to prove that the legislature was bought will not have
much impact on the rational basis test. See Daniel v. Family Sec. Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S.
220, 224 (1949).75. See Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 "There may be narrower scope for
operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face
to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the
Fourteenth." Id.
76. Id. (citations omitted).
77. Id. (citations omitted).
78. See Velman, In Politicizing the Courts, We're Buying and Selling Justice, L.A.
Times, Oct. 16, 1987, § 2, at 7, col.2.
79. See, e.g., Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-56 (1982).
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economically disadvantaged minorities are sometimes equally ineffec-
tive in using the political process. In fact, as the successful use of the
political process by gay rights groups and racial minorities demon-
strates, sufficient economic muscle tied to a single-minded message
can effectively influence the political process.
Despite the questionable logic of Carolene Products' famous foot-
note, it has seldom been challenged; however, it leads to two differ-
ent but equally pernicious results. First, it has led to sixty-three
years of jurisprudential disregard for the breadbasket, gut level kinds
of rights. Unless one's interest falls within one of the Court's "funda-
mental rights" or uses "suspect" classifications, the level of protec-
tion for one's interest has been virtually nil, no matter how
important it is from a pragmatic point of view.80 For example, the
right to vote is one of the fundamental rights. Compare the Court's
tortuous concern for durational residency and voting rights with its
treatment of age discrimination and employment. As for durational
residency 'and the regular election, one year is too much,8 1 but fifty
days is sufficient,8 2 and the exact date is subject to case by case litiga-
tion. All in all, a very complex series of cases attempts to protect
one's fundamental right to vote. On the other hand, a sixty-year-old
policeman may be fired based upon the presumption of physical un-
fitness, even though the policeman was proven fit just one year ear-
lier and willing to prove his fitness again.8 3 A foreign service
employee is required to retire at age sixty because it is presumed that
80. The number of successful challenges on rational basis grounds since 1937 is so
small as to make one wonder why the Court even agrees to hear such cases. Even the
one notable success, Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), which struck down a closed
class that gave an advantage to American Express, was overruled in New Orleans v.
Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976). With the exception of Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Ward, 470
U.S. 869 (1985), the only successful recent cases have been those involving particularly
sympathetic plaintiffs. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (the Court struck
down a Texas law denying free public school education to children of illegal aliens);
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (the Court found irra-
tional a scheme that denied building permits for group homes for the mentally re-
tarded but allowed them for fraternities and such). Metropolitan Life Ins. found the
discriminatory treatment of out-of-state life insurance companies to be irrational. This
seemed to be more of an inherent limitation of the Commerce Clause than an equal
protection case, but it may be the shining light suggesting that the Court is more will-
ing to carefully review all legislative classifications. The heavy money says that it is
just a Commerce Clause case in odd garb.
81. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (state law requiring one year residency
held unconstitutional).
82. Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 681 (1973).
83. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (mandatory re-
tirement age of 50 for uniformed police officers held constitutional).
only a younger person can handle the pressures of an overseas ap-
pointment when persons performing the same job, but under a Civil
Service classification, are not subject to such a presumption.8 4 Is it
possible that anyone believes that advanced registration require-
ments and voting are in fact more important in the real world than
one's livelihood?85 Yet there are endless examples of the Court's dis-
regard of real world interests under the guise of rationally reviewing
legislation.
A second doubtful result of Carolene Products' two-tier approach
to due process and equal protection analysis has been the elevation of
some interests to a higher level of review8s It is intriguing that
Carolene Products, one of the very early cases rejecting "Lochner-
ism," set the rationale for "new Lochnerism," whereby the Court on
its own initiative elevated certain interests to an extra measure of
due process and equal protection. The Court's actual list of catego-
ries justifying a level of judicial protection higher than the rational
basis test includes some of the categories mentioned in Carolene
Products' footnote, ignores others, and adds a few. Until recently,
free speech and free exercise of religion rights have been accorded
the highest level of review,8 7 but there has been some retreat on free
84. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
85. Certainly, there is no constitutional language which would reveal the reason
for the elevation of the one interest and the denigration of the other. The framers in-
tentionally left the issue of who could vote up to the individual states. Moreover, the
right to vote is not even the best illustration of the gap between "fundamental" and
"important" interests. Unlike right to privacy cases, where the tendency is to practi-
cally ignore competing state interests, the Court's approach to many right to vote is-
sues is closer to a balancing test with some reasonable consideration of competing
interests common to the compelling state interest test.
86. The rational basis test left a power vacuum that the Court has tried to fill in a
number of ways. For a while, it discovered unconstitutional "irrebuttable presump-
tions" before it finally decided that such issues were just rational basis equal protec-
tion claims. The high point of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine was probably
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), in which the Court disapproved
of the way pregnant teachers were treated. Its demise was found in Weinberger v.
Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), in which the Court found rational the presumption that for
some social security purposes, marriages of less than six-months were fraudulent.
The resurrection of the impairment of obligations of contract clause may be another
example of filling this void. See, e.g., United States Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey,
431 U.S. 1 (1977) (state law impaired the obligation of a state's contract in violation of
the contract clause); Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978). Its
apparent subsequent demise is illustrated in Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176
(1983). The Courts elevation of procedural due process concerns, see, e.g., Board of Re-
gents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572-77 (1972) (giving a board definition of
liberty and property interests) and more recently its no taking cases, see, e.g., Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (Commission could not grant a public
easement without paying compensation), may be compensatory approaches as well.
87. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (a public figure must
prove actual malice in a defamation action); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
(compulsory school attendance violated the free exercise rights of the Old Order
Ami h).
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exercise rights.88 Both rights are protected under the first amend-
ment and are not necessarily a part of any. due process jurisprudence.
Racial minorities have received the highest level of protection,89 but
other than protection given by statute the same could not be said for
labor minorities.90 Political minorities are protected only to the de-
gree that they can frame their claims in free speech terms.91 The
Court has also discovered that there are nonenumerated fundamen-
tal rights that deserve a higher level of scrutiny, such as the right to
privacy,92 the right to travel interstate,93 and the right to vote.94 In
addition, state laws which classify based upon illegitimacy of birth,95
gender,96 and alienage 97 receive a higher than normal level of review.
The elevation of certain rights and interests raises a separation of
powers issue every bit as real as that found in Lochner. As to funda-
mental rights or suspect classifications, the government must justify
any regulations by showing that the law or any of its classifications
are narrowly tailored to accomplish some compelling state interest.
Even if the state interest is assumed to be compelling, the regulation
88. See Employment Div., Dep't. of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595
(1990). For a discussion of the case, see supra note 18.
89. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982) (prohibits discrimination based on union
membership).
. 90. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), "Classifications based solely upon race
must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and
hence constitutionally suspect." Id. at 499.
91. Compare United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (rejecting chal-
lenges to the constitutionality of the Hatch Act), with Tashjian v. Republican Party of
Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986) (noting that "[t]he power to regulate the time, place and
manner of elections does not justify, without more, the abridgment of fundamental
rights, such as ... the freedom of political association.").
92. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (state law forbidding the use
of contraceptives violates the right of marital privacy).
93. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (one year residency requirement
for welfare recipients violates the right to travel).
94. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (poll tax violates
the right to vote).
95. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (determining the constitutionality of a
statute barring inheritance based on illegitimacy).
96. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding that female members
of the armed forces should receive the same spousal benefits for their husbands as
male members for their wives).
97. The Court's treatment of alienage is the most convoluted of the group. State
laws denying equal benefits must pass the compelling state interest test. See Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971). But state laws denying aliens equal access to
government jobs which involve substantial discretion must be only rational. Foley v.
Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978). All federal laws which classify based on alienage
must pass only the rational basis test. See, e.g., Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 83 (1976)
("neither requirement [of the federal law] is wholly irrational" so the Court upheld its
validity).
is never sufficiently tailored to withstand this strict scrutiny. Just as
the rational basis test is the abdication of judicial responsibility, the
compelling state interest test is the usurpation of total judicial con-
trol. There is no room left for legislative judgment.
As to due process and equal protection claims, the government al-
most always fails to satisfy the compelling state interest test.98
Although the Court is at pains to deny it, the right to privacy is the
judicial elevation of a non-enumerated right beyond legislative con-
trol, and the battle for any particular right is won or lost at the out-
set by the Court's designation of the right as being fundamental. The
right to privacy is as fundamental as the right to free speech, its ad-
vocates assert. But before the Court came to that conclusion in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut99 just thirty years ago and expanded it in Roe v.
Wade,100 who could have found support for such a proposition in the
Constitution or in our history?O1 If there is support to designate the
right to privacy as fundamental, is there less support for the right to
education? Yet lines that allow states to vary per capita funding of
schools from $2000 to $12,000 per student need only be rational. 0 2
Whatever the right, is it consistent with separation of powers notions
to effectively deny any meaningful consideration of legislative inter-
ests by the statement of the test? What is there about a fundamental
98. It is interesting that one of the few government successes inmeeting this test,
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (which upheld the internment of Japa-
nese-Americans during World War II), was almost certainly wrong. Some record keep-
ing requirements impacting the right to choose an abortion have also passed the test,
provided there exists a sufficient level of confidentiality. See Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 760 (1986) ("A requirement
that the women give what is truly a voluntary and informed consent, as a general
proposition, is, of course, proper and is surely not unconstitutional."). The interest of
the government in protecting the life of the viable fetus during the third trimester is
one of the few examples in which the Court has found a compelling state interest, but
even so, it is subject to the female's greater interest in her own life. See Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973). Benign racial classifications have passed the compelling
state interest test, see Sheet Metal Workers Int'l v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 479-81 (1986)
("we conclude that the relief ordered in this case passes even the most rigorous test
.... "), but any relationship between that test in benign racial cases and hostile racial
cases is coincidental at best. The compelling state interest test has been easier to sat-
isfy in the right to vote cases with the test being closer to balancing. See Bullock v.
Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972) (stating that the law must be "found reasonably neces-
sary to the accomplishment of legitimate state objectives."), except in the reapportion-
ment cases where exact accuracy is required. See Korcler v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725
(1983). Compare the compelling state interest test that the Court claimed to use in the
free exercise cases where it was obvious for a number of years that the actual test was
far less than that. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (upholding an
air force regulation prohibiting an Orthodox Jew from wearing a yarmulke indoors).
99. 381 U.S. 479 (1956).
100. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
101. But cf. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890)
(arguing for protection of the right to privacy as tort relief but not as a constitutional
right).
102. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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right, once it is announced, which denies the states any meaningful
role in the shaping of that right?
Even if some laws should be presumed to be constitutional and
others presumed to be unconstitutional, there is no justification for
the legal gap between the compelling state interest test, or its gender
mutation, the middle level test,103 and the rational basis test. The
difference between the Court's scrutiny of the interest under one test
as opposed to the other is obscure at best and possibly nonexistent.
Yet classification of an interest as fundamental dictates the results
without any meaningful consideration of the private-versus-public in-
terest factors that might usefully be developed. For example, laws
which intentionally work a racial classification are subject to strict
scrutiny, 04 however innocent the classification might be, while neu-
tral laws which merely have a disproportionate racial impact are con-
stitutional if rational, despite questionable motives.1 05
Why are unreasonable restrictions on the right to marry scruti-
nized under a compelling state interest standard, while reasonable re-
strictions receive the rational basis treatment? 06 Why does a
statement of the difference make it seem as if the test is already a
reasonable basis test? When are child-rearing decisions fundamental
and when are they not?i0 7 Why is a choice to abort absolutely pro-
103. A majority of the Court in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), finally agreed
that gender classifications must substantially relate to important governmental inter-
ests and that such a test might be called a middle level test, although the court itself
did not like that term. The fact is that, at least when the interests of women have
been adversely impacted, the test is essentially the same as the compelling state inter-
est test. See, e.g., Los Angeles Dep't. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702
(1978) (a private pension plan requiring women to pay more than men because they
lived longer than men was contrary to federal law, which imposed a standard similar
to the constitutional standard). On the other hand, when the Court perceives that wo-
men are being treated more benevolently, whether they wish to be or not, the test is
little more than a rational one. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (up-
holding the exemption of women from federal draft registration requirements);
Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (treating underage males differently
from underage females for purposes of statutory rape).
104. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (the effects of racial prejudice cannot
justify removing custody of a child from its mother because of her subsequent mar-
riage to someone of a different race).
105. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (the Court found the dispropor-
tionate racial impact of the state's welfare classifications insufficient to change the
level of review, and although there was some evidence of improper racist motive, it
was not sufficient to find the law per se invalid).
106. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (a statute prohibiting schools from
offering curriculum other than English held unconstitutional).
107. Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (statute prohibiting the teaching of
German at a private school held unconstitutional); Pierce v. Societies of Sisters, 268
tected,108 yet the right of a poor person to equal treatment in funding
that choice receives almost no protection?' 0 9 Why are state laws
which regulate benefits of legal aliens subject to the compelling state
interest test, 10 while regulation of illegal alien benefits receives only
the rational basis test?"' Laws that work a gender classification,
particularly those that harm women, are analyzed under a form of
strict scrutiny," 2 while laws that classify based upon pregnancy, 113
impacting only women, are reviewed according to a rational basis
test.
It is easy to understand the appeal of the rational basis/compelling
state interest dichotomy. By fitting any particular case into its pigeon
hole, the Court can easily decide the case without having to deal ex-
tensively with the heart and soul of the issues: funding choices for
abortions get the rational basis test, the Court concludes. Then the
cliches begin to roll off the Justices word processors-we are not a
super-legislature; it is not for us to say whether wise or not; the legis-
lature may decide to handle part of the problem today and the re-
mainder another day; the legislature may conceivably have believed
that this was necessary; etc., etc., etc. The same thing occurs when
the right is a fundamental one. No serious consideration of compet-
ing state interest is part of the process: the woman's right to choose
an abortion is fundamental. The state's interest may be important
but it is not compelling. The female and her doctor are free to make
their own decision. The state cannot substitute its judgment for that
of the female; etc., etc., etc.
U.S. 510 (1925); (statute prohibiting attendance. at private schools held unconstitu-
tional); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (upholding the conviction of a
guardian who permitted a child to work in violation of child labor regulations).
108. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
109. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (ap-
plying the rational basis test to government funding issues related to abortions). See
also Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
110. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (state statute restricting welfare
benefits based on term of alien's residency violates equal protection clause).
111. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (state law denying free public school edu-
cation to children of illegal aliens found to be irrational punishment of children to de-
ter the acts of their parents). At least Plyer is one of the hopeful cases in which the
Court applied the rational basis test in a manner more consistent with the earlier rea-
sonable basis test.
112. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Significantly, the first case which
treated gender classifications as a serious equal protection issue, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971), struck down an automatic preference for men as administrators of the es-
tates of minors on reasonable basis grounds. Id. at 76 (quoting Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
113. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (holding that a state may distinguish
between normal and abnormal pregnancies when establishing insurance benefit pro-
grams); General Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (holding that disability plan pro-
vided to employees may exclude pregnancy when providing coverage for non-work
related disabilities). Both of the cases have been reversed by federal law. Compare
the irrebuttable presumption approach discussed supra note 86.
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The Court defends its presumptive handling of due process and
equal protection issues as being necessary to conserve judicial re-
sources and to more effectively protect the most important individual
and civil rights. It is said that the political process will protect ordi-
nary interests, but that the Court must be vigilant to protect funda-
mental interests. 1 4 But this approach assumes facts not in evidence.
First, by whose measure is the right to a job, or housing, or welfare
less important than the right to choose, to vote, or to travel inter-
state? Second, even if these latter rights are truly so important, it
would seem that the political process would protect them in any
event. Even the de minimis impact on the right to privacy allowed in
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services1 5 has brought pro-choice
protestors to the streets in every major city.116 Third, perhaps the
rights are so obviously important that the Court may summarily pro-
tect them and spend its precious time weighing more difficult issues
like how to balance reasonable concerns for police fitness against le-
gitimate concerns for unfair age discrimination. Fourth, many state
courts routinely give a meaningful level of protection to nonfunda-
mental interests without appearing to waste judicial resources or un-
necessarily weakening their resolve to protect fundamental rights.1 17
Finally, the Supreme Court itself manages to give an infinite variety
of interests individualized attention in the way it addresses proce-
dural due process issues. With regard to procedural due process, the
Court has rejected artificial labels attached to rights and privi-
leges."l8 Previously, rights, when discovered, got full procedural due
process. Privileges got nothing. The Court changed its approach so
that all substantive property and liberty interests received procedural
due process protection, with the level of process varying depending
on the importance of the interest at stake. The importance is deter-
114. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 304 U.S. 144, 487, 152 n.4 (1938); United
States v. Carolene Products, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
115. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
116. Webster is a good illustration of the strident nature of the abortion right to
privacy dispute. While the law upheld in the case seemed to be only a fairly insignifi-
cant extension of the principle that a state may rationally refuse to fund abortions, see
supra note 109, as well as require an additional medical test for near third term abor-
tions, the rhetoric would make it appear to be a dramatic retreat in terms of rights of
privacy. It was no such thing. Not one person can be denied an abortion after Webster
that could have received one prior to Webster.
117. For a discussion of such cases, see Hetherington, State Economic Regulation
and Substantive Due Process of Law, 53 NW. U.L. REV. 13, 226 (1958); Paulsen, The
Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. REV. 91 (1950).
118. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972).
mined by the most practical and pragmatic considerations.119 The
Court rejected the claim based on the right-privilege dichotomy as
determining the issue without any meaningful discussion of the pol-
icy issues underlying the case. The rational basis/compelling state in-
terest dichatomy has exactly the same flaw.
The obvious appeal of the dichotomy makes the separation of pow-
ers issue all the more dangerous. Under the guise of protecting judi-
cial resources for the battle to protect the really fundamental rights,
the Court has virtually abdicated its role in purifying the political
process. When the claim was made that the state legislature had
been bribed into passing a bill preventing undertakers from selling
burial insurance, the Court said that it would not consider motive.120
When former railroad employees were denied benefits while less se-
nior current railway employees were given such benefits, the Court
said that Congress surely intended to do what it did although it was
clear that Congress had not reviewed the bill written by the railroad
unions carefully enough. 12 1 When Congress, in trying to exclude
persons in state prisons, accidentally denied Supplemental Security
Income to certain inmates in mental hospitals, the Court concluded
that surely there must have been some reason for treating inmates in
some mental hospitals in a different way than inmates in other
mental hospitals, which were funded differently but contained the
same types of inmates.122
But the major complaint about fundamental rights is that they
have been so unnecessary. The Court elevated certain rights to avoid
the unnecessarily stingy protection which the rational basis test gives
to most substantive interests, as opposed to the reasonable basis test
for all interests. And what has been gained by this elevation? In
Griswold v. Connecticut,123 the Court found that the right to use con-
traceptives was part of the fundamental right of privacy.124 Then in
Roe v. Wade,125 it held that the right to privacy could not be re-
119. There has been some retreat from the Court's initial early enthusiasm for its
procedural due process reforms. Now the Court focuses more on state law and less on
overall assessments of the importance of a particular interest, especially as to property
rights. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (a property right in a government
job depends on whether the law provided for termination for cause or left it to the will
of the supervisor). Liberty interests are less dependent on state law. But see Vitek v.
Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980) ("state statutes may create liberty interests that are en-
titled to the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause.").
120. Daniel v. Family Sec. Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 224 (1949) ("We cannot under-
take a search for motive in testing constitutionality.").
121. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980).
122. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 235 (1981) ("We believe that the decision...
must be considered Congress' deliberate, considered choice.").
123. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
124. Id. at 485.
125. 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
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stricted without some compelling state interest.126 Why did the court
need to discover some fundamental right in order to strike down a
ban on married persons using contraceptives? The Weaver reason-
able basis test would have led to the same result without generating a
national debate on what else is included in the right to privacy. The
only reason the fundamental right/compelling state interest scenario
was necessary in Griswold was because the Court abdicated its re-
sponsibility to give a reasonable level of review to legislative deci-
sions. As a result, the legislature was then hamstrung to try to
address more legitimate concerns like responsible access of minors to
contraceptives.' 27
It is obvious that civil libertarians will be outraged at the sugges-
tion that fundamental rights are somewhat less than fundamental,
but the purpose of this paper is not to denigrate such rights. It is
simply not clear that the elevation of certain rights has led to a
higher level of protection overall than application of the reasonable
basis test for all interests would have brought. For example, in Bow-
ers v. Hardwick 128 the Court refused to accord fundamental rights
status to sexual choices by adults.' 29 Although it may be correct that
such interests should not rise to the level of judicial concern for ra-
cial discrimination, is anyone exactly sure what the governmental in-
terest is for limiting such choices? Without being put to the task of
elevating such interests to fundamental, is it not apparent that the
Court might have found such laws to have failed the reasonable basis
test? What can be said of Maher v. Roe,'30 in which the Court sub-
jected decisions to fund abortions to the rational basis test, and stated
that governmental decisions not to fund abortions for indigent wo-
men passed that test?' 3 ' It is not clear how the reasonable basis test
would have come out, but at least there would have been a fairer con-
sideration of the interest of indigent women. Similarly, in Geduldig
v. Aiello,' 32 the Court found that classifications based upon
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (a divided and con-
fused Court could not agree on any single rationale for holding invalid a New York
law limiting the access of minors under 16 to contraceptives).
128. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
129. Id. at 191. "[R]espondent would have us announce, as the Court of Appeals did,
a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy. This we are quite unwilling to
do." Id.
130. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
131. Id. at 478-80.
132. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
pregnancies received and passed the rational basis test.13 3 Might the
reasonable basis test have made a difference?
Even as to harder issues like race classifications and the right to
choice, is it that obvious that strict scrutiny has advanced individual
and civil rights appreciably over a more balanced consideration of
legislative choices? As to race classifications, the answer is easy.
The strict scrutiny test has not advanced individual rights of minori-
ties at all, and instead, may have even adversely impacted minority
interests. No hostile racial classification can withstand even the rea-
sonable basis test. To bring in the heavy guns of the compelling state
interest test seems to be overkill. Yet to apply the compelling state
interest test to benign racial classifications denies minorities the suc-
cess they have gained from the use of the political process. 134 Also,
the reasonable basis test may actually be more protective of majority
interests against reverse discrimination than the Court's idiosyncratic
application of the supposed compelling state interest test.135
As for the right to choice, it is not clear what the result of Roe v.
Wade130 might have been had the Court used the reasonable basis
test. Almost certainly, a greater range of state regulations would
have been permitted. Perhaps bans on second-term abortions not
necessary to save the life of the mother would have been included.
But the lines between permissible abortions which allow the affluent
to find some loophole, and the ability of the law to impact only those
lacking the funds to find a sympathetic doctor, might have fallen
under a reasonable basis test. As mentioned above, the reasonable
basis test would require that funding choices be fairer. Also, maybe
some additional balancing in the abortion cases might have led to less
heat on both sides. Whatever the outcome, why are legislative con-
cerns for such things as unborn fetuses, the psychological impact of
abortion on the female, the emotional impact of late-second-term
aborted fetuses on doctors and nurses, or the biological interest of the
133. Id. at 495-96.
134. Justice Marshall has consistently called for a middle level test for benign ra-
cial classification. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 401 (1978)
(Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
135. This is sheer speculation since it is far from clear as to exactly what the
Court's approach to affirmative action is. It is known that a person cannot be fired in
the name of affirmative action. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274-
80 (1986). But some preferences are acceptable; see Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448
(1980) (Congressional spending power encompasses the ability to institute racial classi-
fications to further constitutional goals), but not always, see City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (state affirmative action measures may only remedy
presents effects of past discrimination), -unless Congress passes the law, and then it
may be all right, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3008-09 (1990) ("we
hold that benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress-even if those meas-
ures are not 'remedial' . . . are constitutionally permissible").
136. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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father entitled to virtually no weight in the judicial process given the
bias of the compelling state interest test? On the other hand, do the
regulations that prevent the sale of pharmaceutical drugs which
could lessen the expense and emotional impact of early abortions
pass the reasonable basis test? In any event, why shouldn't the Court
undertake a more balanced consideration of the competing interests
on both sides of this debate, instead of pretending that there is any-
thing in the Constitution which conclusively determines this issue?
Any advantage the compelling state interest/rational basis dichot-
omy might have on such fundamental issues as race and the right to
choice is soon lost when the full range of issues is explored. However
important the right to vote is, does anyone actually believe that the
interest in being free from arbitrary dismissal from a job is any less
important? The fundamental right to travel shields one from penal-
ties which otherwise would result from the impacting of life's neces-
sities, whatever those are.137 It means that durational residency
requirements which are placed on the receipt of welfare are uncon-
stitutional because somehow rights to travel are involved and the
state interest is not compelling. But classifications which deny those
with needy children a survival income, while allowing funds to go to
the blind and elderly, are constitutional because they are rational.138
Can it be that the right to travel across state lines, already protected
by the commerce clause, deserves a higher level of due process and
equal protection analysis than laws impacting a person's ability to
feed the kids tomorrow?
IV. CONCLUSION
Although it seems that the abandonment of the reasonable basis
test and the subsequent use of the rational basis test created a void
which made the compelling state interest test necessary, it is not re-
ally necessary to abandon the dichotomy to undo much of the harm.
The compelling state interest test and its litany of suspect classifica-
tions and fundamental rights can be maintained in order to protect
settled expectations, but the Court can still play its appropriate role
in protecting individuals against unreasonable abuse of legislative
137. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). The Court noted that a one year
residency requirement before one could receive welfare benefits created a classifica-
tion which denied to one class "welfare aid upon which may depend the ability of the
families to obtain the very means to subsist - food, shelter, and other necessities of
life." Id. at 627.
138. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
power. Not every back room deal deserves the automatic approval
that the rational basis test almost surely guarantees. The result of a
more meaningful level of review would be to take the pressure off
the ever more creative claims for strict scrutiny. 3 9 The Court could
protect substantive interests without denying the legislature its right-
ful role in helping to shape the way American society balances com-
peting interests.
139. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982) (the argument that illegal
alienage is a suspect classification was dismissed by the Court); City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 442-47 (1985) (the Court dismissed the argument
that classifications based on mental retardation are suspect); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (the Court dismissed the argument that there is a fundamental
right to engage in homosexual sodomy).
